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PSYCHOLOGICAL CENTRALITY AND SELF-CONCEPT CHANGE

Clifford L. Staples
University of North Dakota

INTRODUCTION

Any

theory

of

the

self-concept

must

"thorny problem of self-concept change

address

itself

(Rosenberg,

1979:

to

the

76)."

That is, what are the conditions under which individuals will be

willing or unwilling to change the way they think and feel about
themselves? Here we explore the possibility that the psychologi
cal centrality (Rosenberg, 1979: 73-77) or relative phenomenological importance, of a self-conception is one factor that
influences a person's willingness to consider changing that selfconception.

Rosenberg (1979:

75-76) develops the problem of psychological

centrality and self-concept change in terms of the apparently
contradictory evidence generated by attempts to get people to
change the way they think and feel about themselves.

On the one

hand, he notes, experimental social psychologists such as
Videbeck (1960), Haehr, et al.
(1962), and Webster and Sobieszek
(1974) (and I would add Alexander and colleagues, 1969; 1971;
1977; 1981) seem to have little difficulty getting subjects to
change their self-conceptions in response to experimental treat
ments of one sort or another.
On the other hand, Rosenberg

points out, clinicians consistently report that self-concept

change is one of the most difficult goals to achieve in therapy.
Rosenberg (1979: 75) argues that the concept of "psychological
centrality" is the key to understanding these contradictory find
ings surrounding the problem of self-concept change.
Psychological centrality refers to the idea that the identities

and attributes that make up the self-concept are not all equally
important to us, but vary in the extent to which they are central
or peripheral to the way we think about ourselves.

This idea has

its roots in the writings of the first generation of social
psychologists (i.e. James, 1890; Cooley, 1902; and Mead, 1934),
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and has been developed in contemporary work under different
names, including "identity salience" (Stryker, 1968; McCall and
Simmons, 1978), "role/person merger" (Turner, 1978), "central
life interests" (Dubin, 1956), "role commitment" (Heiss, 1981)
and "authenticity" (Gecas and Mortimer, 1984).

Using this idea, Rosenberg suggests that experimental social
psychologists are able to report changes in self-conceptions as a
result of experimental treatments because the self-conceptions

which are the focus of these experiments are almost always of

little or no importance to the subjects involved.

Thus, consis

tent with Alexander's (see Alexander and Wiley, 1981 for a re

view) "situated identity" theory, it is not at all surprising to
find that in these artfully contrived experimental situations,

subjects will latch on to whatever self-attributions have been

defined as socially desirable.

The willingness of subjects to

identify themselves with these situatiohally specific and social
ly desirable identities can then be interpreted as evidence to
support the position that the self—concept is a relatively mal

leable entity, subject to manipulation in the social psychology

laboratory.

In contrast, he argues, clinicians face stiff oppo

sition in their attempts to get their patients to change their
views of themselves because the self—conceptions which are the

focus of psychotherapy are undoubtedly of central importance to
their patients.
He interprets this evidence to support the

position that the self-concept is a far more durable entity than
the experimental evidence implies. For Rosenberg (1979: 76), the
concept of psychological centrality nicely resolves these contra

dictory findings:

An experimenter can easily convince us that we are
poor connoisseurs of white burgundy, but can he as
easily convince us that we are fascists or latent
homosexuals? . . . Whether it is difficult or

easy to change a self-concept component thus de
pends in large part on how critical it is to the
individual's svstem of self-values.

The person

who has staked himself solidly on certain statuses
or dispositions may resist, with all the resources

at his disposal, any efforts to change these elements,
for his very concept of self and feeling of self-

worth rest on these foundations.

Rosenberg's main point in this discussion is to emphasize the
significance of the idea of psychological centrality for under
standing the dynamics of the self-concept (see also, Rosenberg
and Pearlin, 1978). (footnote #1) Along the way, however, he
has raised an important issue.
If Rosenberg is correct, and
experimental social psychologists studying this problem have,
either by design or by default, focused only on relatively triv

ial components of the self-concept, his interpretation would
support the view, held by many, that experimental social psychol
ogy is largely irrelevant to helping us understand^ the most

important questions of human' social behavior (see Ring, 1967;
Katz, 1972; McGuire, 1973; Gergen, 1973; Helmreich, 1975).
12
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This issue is of particular concern to sociologists, since the
self-concept is probably the most important and most studied
topic in sociological social psychology (see Rosenberg and
Turner, 1981; Rosenberg and Kaplan, 1982).
This long-standing
interest continues because it is generally thought to be the idea
best capable of addressing the fundamental problem of the disci

pline:

the mutual determination of the individual and society

(Mead, 1934; Rosenberg, 1981).
If, however, experiments in the
social psychology laboratory are destined to be limited to focus
ing on superficial aspects of the self-concept, then social
psychological experimentation is also destined to be limited in
its capacity to contribute to our understanding of this fundamen
tal problem.

'

Intended or not,

Rosenberg's

(1979:

75-76)

discussion of the

relationship between psychological centrality and self-concept
change constitutes a challenge to experimentally inclined social
psychologists interested in the self-concept.
If Rosenberg is
correct, had these experiments focusing on self-concept change
targeted psychologically central rather than psychologically
peripheral self-conceptions— perhaps closer to the kind of selfconceptions that clinicians deal with— no changes in the selfconcept would have been found because psychologically central
self-conceptions are immune to the sort of manipulations general
ly employed in these experiments.
Though this explanation is
plausible, to my knowledge, neither Rosenberg nor anyone else has
attempted to test it directly.
The question is this:
is it
possible to induce change in psychologically central selfconceptions under experimental conditions?
If not, then
Rosenberg's hypothesis about the relationship between psychologi
cal centrality and self-concept change would be supported and the
relevance of experimental social psychology to exploring the
self-concept would appear limited. If so, then Rosenberg's hypo
thesis would be challenged and the relevance of experimental
social psychology to exploring the self-concept would appear
unlimited. Intrigued by this question, I conducted an experiment
designed to answer it.
This paper is a report of the findings
from that experiment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CENTRALITY AND SELF-CONCEPT CHANGE
The Self-Concept

If

we

ask

someone

of

this

culture

and

time

to

write

down

a

dozen or so statements in answer to the question "Who am I?"
(Kuhn and HcPartland, 1954) we find that he or she generally has

little difficulty in doing so.
The responses we get usually
consist of a mixture of social identities
(e.g. "welder,"
"mother," "blood donor") and self-attributes (e.g. "kind," "a
likable person," "mixed up,").
It is generally accepted among
contemporary researchers that an exhaustive inventory of such
statements

from a

person

at a

particular moment

in time would

constitute an individual's global self-concept (Rosenberg, 1979:
ix;- Gecas, 1982) .

13
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It was initially assumed that the spontaneous ordering of the

responses in answer to the question "Who am I?" constituted a

measurement of the relative importance of these statements to the
individual: those responses which occurred first were thought to

be more important than those responses that came later (Kuhn and

HcPartland, 1954: 72). Subsequent research, however, has shown
this assumption to be false (McPhail and Tucker, 1972; Tucker,
1966; Staples, 1980). If subjects are instructed, following the
initial listing of responses, to "please reorder (or not) these
statements in terms of how important each is to defining who you

are as a person," the concordance between the rankings of the two
lists of self-statements tends to be quite low.

However, these

latter findings do suggest that, while these self-statements do
not appear in order of importance to the person spontaneously,
subjects apparently have little difficulty reordering their
statements in terms of their importance when specifically asked
to do so.

Thus, there is good reason to believe that the self-

concept is not only composed of discrete identities and attri

butes, but that these components are experienced as being more or

less important to the person. It is this dimension of the self
concept that we refer to as "psychological centrality

{Rosenberg, 1979), or phenomenological importance, and it is this

dimension of the self-concept that we would like to discuss in
relation to self-concept change.

Self-Concept Change

_

..t. i.

^

In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary that we
clear
about what we mean by self-concept change.
Here, self-concept
change refers to change in identity, or role-identity. From a

sociological perspective, role-identities are of particular in
terest because it is through one's roles that we are most

directly linked to the groups and institutions that make up
society.
Therefore, in talking about self-concept change in
terms of change in role-identities we are also talking about the
process through which individuals align or distance themselves

from the various and sometimes competing groups that mal^ up
society. Thus, by understanding what motivates people to change
their commitment to role-identities we may also shed some light
on the problem of how and why groups capture, hold on to, and
lose their members (see also Kornhauser, 1962; Coser, 1979).

The problem of psychological centrality and self concept change
identity and the willingness or unwillingness of an individual to

concerns the relationship between the subjective importance of an

change that identity. The hypothesis preferred by Rosenberg
(1979: 75-76) and others (Turner, 1978; Gecas and Mortimer,
1984:11) is that the more psychologically central, or important,
the identity, the less likely a person will be to change the
identity.
The primary justification for this hypothesis

appears to rest on an appeal to the self-esteem motive and the
presumed relationship between psychological centrality and ^the
need for self-esteem.
As Rosenberg (1979: 76) states. The
person who has staked himself solidly on certain statuses or
dispositions may resist, with"all the resources at his disposal,
any efforts to change these elements, for his very concept of
14
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self ^id feeling ^

emphasis)."

self-worth rest on these foundations (my

Conversely,

self-conceptions

that

are

psychologically peripheral should be more amenable to change

because the individual's self-esteem is not dependent on these

unimportant self-conceptions. As Rosenberg (1979:75-76) notes,
in discussing the experiment of Videbeck (1960; se also Haehr et
al., 1962; Webster and Sobieszek, 1974; Alexander and Wiley,

1981), subjects who were arbitrarily rated as either good or bad
"speech experts" were easily persuaded to change their opinion of

themselves as "speech experts" because the identity of "speech

expert," invented for the experiment, was probably irrelevant to
most of the subjects (see also James, 1890: 309).
From this
perspective, the results of this experiment might have been much
different had the subjects been members of the debate team.

This hypothesis is very compelling. It is well-grounded theo
retically and also seems consistent with common-sense assumptions
about human behavior.
Are there any grounds, therefore, to
expect us to be able to induce change in self-conceptions that

are psychologically central to people as a result of an experi
mental treatment?

The first hypothesis implies that the first, and perhaps only,

response people make to a threat to the self is to hold on to the

self-conception that is threatened.

That is, there is a motive

for self-concept consistency, or stability (Rosenberg, 1979:5762). Self-consistency, according to Rosenberg (1979: 57) ". . .

refers to the motive to act in accordance with the self-concept
and to maintain it intact in the face of potentially challenging
evidence." This idea may be sound in general; however, when used

in this way it elevates the self-consistency motive over the
self-esteem motive. That is, if self-consistency, underlies our
most central self-conceptions, than the predictable response to a
threat to our most central self—conceptions is self—concept sta

bility.

This is precisely the prediction we are led to by

Rosenberg (1979: 75-76). Thus, where at first it appears that
Rosenberg's (1979: 75-76) hypothesis regarding the relationship
between psychological centrality and self-concept change rests on
the self-esteem motive, closer inspection suggests that a per
son's unwillingness to change important self-conceptions is moti
vated not by the need for self-esteem, but by the need for self-

consistency.

cally central

If self-esteem is the motive underlying psychologi
self-conceptions,

then

is

it

not

reasonable

to

expect that self-esteem could be maintained or enhanced just as
easily by changing self-conceptions as by holding on to them?
In our view, the need for self-consistency, is subordinate to
the need for self-esteem. We believe that people have.an over

riding need to feel good about themselves and that they will
struggle to maintain these good feelings whenever they are
threatened and will strive to enhance them whenever possible
(Rokeach, 1980).
Consequently, when faced with a threat to the
self, people will be just as willing to change their self-

conceptions as they will be to hold onto them-- not because they

have a need to change or hold onto self-conceptions, but because

they have a need to maintain or enhance self-esteem (Rokeach,
1980; Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984: 19-20).

15
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Further, we also believe that, in general, when we reflect upon
our selves, certain identities and attributes are seen to be mop
important than others because it is through these aspeps of the
self that we hope to demonstrate, to ourselves and othep, op
competence and morality. That is, the psycholopcal centrality
of a self-conception is a function of the extent to which thp
self-conception gives us, or holds the promise of giving us, tne
feeling that we are competent and moral people.

^

If. as is suggested above, the self-esteem motive ptermines

the psychological centrality of a self-conception then the secret
to inducing change in psychologically central
to get subjects to question their beliefs about the morality and
competence of those self-conceptions. These consperatpns lep
us to propose that individuals will be more, not less,
bo
change their central self-conceptions than they wpl be to chanp
their peripheral self-conceptions, provided that they come ^
believe that it is necessarv to change those self-pnceptions ^
order to maintain or enhance their self-esteem.

It is precisely

because our important self-conceptions are the prpary sopces of
our self-esteem that we are acutely senspive to any feedbpk
about those self-conceptions that has implicatip tor self eval
uation.

Thus, we are constantly seeking out, through role

taking, social comparisons, and self-attribpion (pjsenberg,

1979; Gecas, 1982), information about the self-concepions that
are most important to us. In contrast, bpause

tant self-conceptions are less important to our self-esteem, we

arf much less Lnsitive to any feedback about those peripheral

^^FurthTrT^where information about. our -less

conceptions is likely to have little or "o

discoveries about our most central
to
set in motion a process of self-evaluation leading either to

feelings of self-satisfaction or feeling of self-dissatisfaction,
depending upon whether or not the feedback p get suggests op
performance is consistent or

consistency, but with our need for self-esteem (Ball Rokeach et

^^FinilVv/feelings of self-dissatisfaction arising from the
recognition of inconsistencies between

our need for self-esteem will lead us to change, or apemp to

change, whatever it is about ourselves that has tpepened our
sense of self-worth or self-competence. In contrast, feepng of
le5l?^satislaction arising from the recognition
®°"fA\tenpes
between our self-conceptions and our need for self-esteem will

lllTls to hold onto, or attempt to hold °"to, w^tevp it rs
about ourselves that has

al

198^ It

self-competence (Rokeach, 1980; Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984. 17

^^The ideas developed above lead to competing hpothesp
ing the likelihood of inducing change in

first

self-conceptions through an experimental breapep. The txrsr
hypothesis, relying largely on the self-consistency
oSts that it will be $asier to change unimportant self
conceptions than it will be, to change i™P°rtant self-conpppp.
In contrast, the second hypothesis, relying entirely on the
16
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esteem motive, suggests that it will be easier to change impor
tant self-conceptions than it will be to change unimportant selfconceptions, with the provision that the attempt to change these
self-conceptions must implicate the self-esteem upon which they
are based.

POLITICAL IDENTITY AND THE METHOD OF SELF-CONFRONTATION

To determine whether or not it is possible to change psycho
logically central self-conceptions through an experimental treat
ment, an experiment was designed that (1) focused on a identity
that we might reasonably expect to vary in its degree of psycho
logical centrality across subjects and (2) provided subjects with

feedback about the relationships between their identities, on the
one hand, and their related values and attitudes, on the other
hand, in a way that implicated the morality of their identities.
The experiment focused on what we

identity.

have

called the political

Here, political identity refers to the liberal—

conservative ideological spectrum as we know it at this time in

the United States.

As public opinion polls clearly demonstrate,

many Americans can and do identify themselves along the liberal—
conservative continuum. And, though it is not always clear that
everyone means the same thing by "liberal," or "conservative," it
is reasonably certain that this spectrum allows individuals to

identify with or distance themselves from fairly well defined
political groups and ideologies. Thus, as discussed above, the

political

identity is a

role-identity to the extent that

it

functions to align individuals with or distance them from groups

and insti1:utions. Moreover, the political identity is one that
allows variability in psychological centrality.
As the polls
also indicate, many people care about politics,

are active in

political organizations, and have well-defined political identi

ties, while other people have no interest in politics, rarely

vote or participate in political organizations,

and have ill-

defined political identities.
In other words, people vary a
great deal in the level of commitment to these political groups
and this variability of commitment is reflected at an individual

level in the variability of the psychological centrality of the

political identity across individuals.

The second hypothesis stipulates that the attempt to change
political identity must in one way or another implicate the
subject's sense of self-worth or self-competence.
Rokeach's

(1-968; 1973; see Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984 for a review) method
of self-confrontation is ideally suited to this requirement.
In
a series of studies done over the past twenty years, Rokeach and

his colleagues have induced predictable long-term changes in

values,

attitudes,

and

behaviors by presenting subjects with

feedback about these beliefs and behaviors in a way that induces

either feelings of self-satisfaction leading to stability or
feelings of self-dissatisfaction leading-to change.
In

the

experiment

treatment was

described

below,

a

self-confrontation

employed that was designed to provide subjects

feedback about possible consistencies or inconsistencies between

their political values and attitudes and their political
identities in a way that would implicate the morality of their
17
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political identities.
Consistent with Rokeach's theory, we
should expect some subjects to become dissatisfied with what they
discover about themselves, and therefore we also expect them to
change their political identities in a direction that will main
tain or enhance their self-esteem.

If the first hypothesis regarding the relationship between
psychological centrality and self-concept change is correct, then
we should find that those subjects who care less about their
political identities should change them more than those subjects
who care a great deal about their political identities.
If the
second hypothesis is correct then we should find the opposite:
subjects who care a great deal about their political identities
should change them more than those who care little about their
political identities.
SUBJECTS, MEASUREMENT, AND PROCEDURES
Subjects

All of the 120 subjects who participated in the experiment
were students attending Washington State University during the
summer of 1985.
Students in both introductory and advanced
sociology classes were asked to volunteer to participate in a
study of "values and politics."
Measurement

POLITICAL IDENTITY To measure political identity, subjects
were asked to place an adhesive label with the word "myself"
printed on it on a scale that had "EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE" at the
top, "MODERATE" in the middle, and "EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE" at
the bottom.
After the experiment, placement on the scale was
assigned an arbitrary score ranging from "0" to "100" such that a
score

of

"0"

indicates

"EXTREMELY

LIBERAL,"

indicates "MODERATE,' and a score of "100"
CONSERVATIVE."
Pretest data on 58 student
scores ranged from 8 to 85, with a mean of
deviation of 17.71.
Four-week test-retest

a

score

of

"50"

indicates "EXTREMELY
subjects showed that
42.98 and a standard
reliability was .79

for a pretest sample of 43 student subjects.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CENTRALITY

To measure

the

psychological

cen

trality of the political identity, subjects were asked to indi
cate whether their political identity was "very important,"
"somewhat important,"

"not very important," or "completely un

important" in response to the following statement!
"Some people
care a great deal about their political identity— it is very
important to them. Other people don't care very much about their
political identity— it isn't important to them at all.
Below,
check the statement that comes closest to YOUR view."
Procedures

The experiment utilized a pretest-posttest control group design
(Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 13-25) with the posttest occurring 1
week after

the

experimental

session.

Subjects

were

randomly

assigned to experimental and control groups.
Two researchers
(the author and an assistant) , both males approximately the same
age, conducted the pretest and posttest sessions.
The two re18
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searchers were assigned to control and experimental sessions
randomly.
All subjects provided self-generated identification
numbers that were used to match pretest and posttest question
naires, thereby assuring subject anonymity.
EXPERIMENTAL SESSION

After providing the pretest data on

their political identities and the psychological centrality of
their political identities, subjects were asked to complete the

Rokeach Value Survey (1982, Form G), which asks subjects to rank
order 18 terminal values " . . . in order of their importance to
YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life," One of these values is
"EQUALITY: brotherhood, equal opportunity for all,"which has been

shown to be strongly related to political ideology (Rokeach,

1973).

In addition, subjects also were asked to answer and then

compute their scores on 3 scales composed of 5 questions each
that measured their attitudes toward equal rights for blacks,
women, and gays.

When all subjects had completed the first part of the question

naire, they were instructed to turn to the next page and to focus
their attention on Table 1. This table contains data showing the
Table 1.

"Table l" Shown to Experimental Sxibjects

37 WSU

33

LIBERALS

WSU

20 WSU

MODERATES

CONSERVATIVES

Average rank
of the value

7

14

15

EQUALITY

composite rank order of the value equality by self-reported
political identity as provided by 90 Washington State University

students during the spring, 1985 semester.

Subjects were then

read an interpretation of the table which included the following

statement:

Apparently, by ranking EQUALITY 7th, LIBERALS are saying that
brotherhood and equal opportunity for all is more important to
them than are 11 other values.
On the other hand, by ranking
EQUALITY 15th, CONSERVATIVES are really saying that only 3 other

values are LESS important to them than brotherhood and equal
opportunity for all.
The subjects were

given a

minute

to

absorb

the

information

presented to them and were then instructed to turn the page of
their- questionnaire and direct their attention to the information

presented to them in Table 2. This table provided subjects with
feedback about their attitudes toward equal rights for blacks,
women,

and gays.

Table 2 presented average scores on each of

these scales as provided by the same 90 Washington state
University students who provided the data shown in Table 1. The
subjects were first told that high scores (25) on these attitude
scales Indicated opposition to equal rights, while low scores on

19
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Table 2.

"Table 2" Shown to Experimental Subjects

37

WSU

LIBERALS
BLACKS

33

WSU

MODERATES

20

WSU

CONSERVATIVES

9.8

11.4

12.5

WOMEN

10.0

10.4

11.8

GAYS

12.9

14.5

15.6

these attitude scales indicated a favorable attitude toward equal
rights.
The subjects were then read an interpretation of the
table which included the following statement:
Thus, our findings from Table 2 support those we found in Table
1:
CONSERVATIVES are less in favor of equality than are LIBERALS
and this finding is also reflected in the fact that CONSERVA
TIVES, on average, also tend to be more racist, more sexist, and
more anti-gay than are LIBERALS.
After completing several additional questions regarding their
feelings about what they had discovered, the subjects were thank
ed for their participation, encouraged to attend the posttest
session, and dismissed.

THE CONTROL SESSION The control session involved providing
subjects with a placebo self-confrontation.
This was done in
order to insure that the control group experienced the same
psychodynamic processes as the treatment group (Greenstein,
1976:258).
After completing the sections on their political
identity and values, subjects were provided with feedback showing
differences in the composite rank order of four instrumental
values (ambitious, broad-minded, helpful, and independent) by
five different academic majors (nursing, social science, communi
cation, business, and commercial recreation).
These data (not
shown) had been collected from 58 sociology students at
Washington State University during the previous semester.
The
subjects were invited to compare their chosen- academic major and
their rankings of these four values with the majors and rankings
of the students shown to them in the table.
When all subjects
had completed the the questionnaire, they were thanked for their
participation, encouraged to return in one week for the posttest
session, and dismissed.
THE POSTTEST SESSION

One week after the pretest,

102 of the

original 120 subjects returned to complete a posttest question
naire that measured their values and political identities. After
completing the posttest questionnaires, the subjects were de
briefed, thanked for their cooperation, and dismissed.

PRETEST ANALYSTS
Fifty-four Of the original 62 control sub
jects and 48 of the original 58 experimental subjects returned
20
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for the posttest.

A comparison of the pretest scores between the

102 subjects who came to both sessions and the 18 subjects who
attended only the first session revealed that the latter group
tended to be slightly more conservative and to feel

that their

political identity was somewhat less important than did the
former group. These differences, however, were not statistically
significant.
Consequently, the following analysis focuses
exclusively on the 102 subjects for which both pretest and
posttest data are available.

While no statistically significant pretest differences were
found between treatment groups on any of the variables,
experimental subjects ranked equality slightly lower than did
control subjects (mean experimental=10.73, mean control=9.53) and
were also slightly more conservative than were control subjects
(mean experimental= 48.55, mean control=42.59). Consequently, we

control for variation in pretest scores between treatment groups
by analyzing pretest-posttest change scores (Campbell and
Stanley, 1966: 23) , defined as pretest political identity score

minus posttest political identity score.
score indicates a

conservative political

change score indicates a

pretest

to

posttest,

a

shift in a

positive

Thus,

since a high

identity,

a

negative

conservative direction from

score

indicates

a

shift

in

a

liberal direction between pretest and posttest, and a score of 0

indicates no change in political identity from pretest to posttest.
FINDINGS

Before presenting the results of the experiment,

it is useful

to briefly discuss what we were attempting to accomplish with the
experimental treatment.
This treatment was designed to take
advantage of the fact that many Americans espouse or support the
democratic principle of equality and equal opportunity.
Or, if
they do not espouse or support it themselves, they are at least
aware of the idea that to be a good American is to believe, at
least to some extent, in equal rights for others.
The informa

tion presented to experimental subjects, however, implied that
some individuals were more in favor of equality than were other
individuals.
Specifically, the information from Table l and
Table 2 suggested that liberals were more in favor of equality
and

equal

rights

than were moderates

or

conservatives.

Most

importantly, by inference, this information also suggested that
liberals, by virtue of their relatively greater support for
equality, were more moral (i.e. "better Americans") than either
moderates or conservatives.

In short,

immediately after these

subjects had identified themselves as liberals,

moderates,

or

conservatives, we provided these subjects with feedback concern
ing the relative morality of liberals, moderates, and conserva
tives.

The situation we created in the experimental session was de

signed to initiate a process of focused self-evaluation among the
subjects.

In short,

we challenged them to confront the moral

implications of their political

identities.

According

to

Rokeach's (1973; 1980; Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984) theory of selfconfrontation, some subjects should have felt satisfied and some
21
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subjects should have felt dissatisfied by what they discovered
about themselves. iUnong the satisfied subjects we should observe
little or no change in political identity.
Indeed, as a conse

quence of self-satisfaction, these subjects should have been
motivated to strengthen and affirm their political identities

(Ball-Rokeach et al.,

1984: 32-36).

In contrast, those subjects

who felt dissatisfied with themselves should have been motivated

to change their political identities in order to assuage their
feelings of dissatisfaction and protect their self-esteem.

question of central concern to us is:

The

who is more likely to have

been affected by this feedback, those subjects who cared a great

deal about being a liberal, moderate, or consei^ative, or those
subjects who cared very little about being a liberal, moderate,
or conservative?

If the impact of self-confrontation varies by level of psycho

logical centrality then we should expect to find a statistically
significant interaction between treatment and psychological cen
trality.
This hypothesis was tested with a 2 X 4, treatment by
psychological centrality, analysis of variance.
The dependent
variable is change in political identity from the pretest to the

posttest, where a positive value indicates a shift in a liberal

direction.

The results of the two-way ANOVA are presented in Table 3. As
we might expect, neither the main effect for treatment nor the
main effect for psychological
centrality are statistically
Table 3.

Treatment X Psychological Centrality ANOVA

Dependent Variable: Change in Political Identity
Sum of

Squares

DF

F

Sig.

26.613

1

.190

.644

379.095

3

.900

.444

1580.340

3

3.753

.014

1987.008

7

2.023

.060

Residual

13192.482

94

Total

15179.490

101

Main Effects

Treatment
Psychological

Centrality
2-Way Interaction

Treatment X
Psychological
Centrality

Explained

22
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significant.
In particular, there is no reason- to expect an
overall shift in political identity in a particular direction
because the treatment is expected to affect the subjects in
different ways;
some subjects may not change at all, some nay
become more liberal, and sone nay become more conservative.
In
contrast, the 2-way interaction between treatment and psychologi
cal centrality is statistically significant
(F=3.753, DF=3,
sig.=.014).
Thus, as expected, the effect of the self-confronta
tion on change in political identity appears to have varied by
the level of psychological centrality of the political identity.
Having established a statistically significant interaction
between self-confrontation and psychological centrality, we now
turn to the question of which subjects— those with high psycho
logical centrality or those with low psychological centrality for
the dependent variable.
As indicated, 5 of the 8 cells in the

Table 4. Means For Change in Political Identity for Treatment X
Psychological Centrality ANOVA

Psychological Centrality
of Political Identity
1 2

3

4

Treatment Group

Experimental

ffiean=
N=

11.44
(9)

-3.25
(20)

-2.81
(16)

3.00
(3)

Control

mean=

-6.25

-1.65

1.82

-2.75

(20)

(22)

(4)

N=

(8)

1= "very important,"
2="somewhat important,"
important," 4="not at all important"

3="not very

table show a shift in political identity in a conservative
direction from the pretest to the posttest, while the remaining 3
cells show a shift in a liberal direction.
Importantly, the
subjects showing the largest average change in political identity

from the pretest to the posttest are the experimental subjects
for whom the political identity was "very important."
As
expected, these 9 subjects shifted their political identity in a
liberal direction, and this shift averaged 11.44 points on the
100 point political identity scale.
A Duncan's Multiple Range
Test revealed that the mean
change for this group was signifi
cantly different from the mean change in the "very important"
control group, both,the experimental and control "somewhat impor
tant" groups, and the "not very important" experimental group at
the .05 level.
No other 2-way comparisons were significant at
the ,05 level.
Using the more conservative Scheffe Multiple
Comparison Test, however, none of the 2-way comparisons possible
in Table 4 were significant at the .05 level.
Thus, while the
23
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"very important" experimental subjects exhibited the largest
change in political identity of all subjects defined by the 2-way
interaction,

the results of the

statistical

tests

employed

are

contradictory, suggesting that we be cautious in placing confi
dence in this finding.
With only 17 subjects in the "very impor
tant" category, a case by case analysis of the data is feasible
and informative.
Table 5 arrays each of the 17 cases by treat
ment group, showing their pretest, posttest, and change scores
for both political identity (high scores are conservative, low
scores are liberal) and the ranking of the value equality on the
Table

5.

Case

Subjects

by

in the

Case

"Very

Data

For

17

Important"

Experimental

and

Psychological

Control

Centrality

Category.

Equality

Political Identity
Posttest Change

Pretest

Pretest
EX#1
EX#2
EX#3
EX#4
EXI5
EX#6
EX#7
EX#8
EX#9
C0#1
C0#2
C0#3
C0#4
C0#5
C0#6
C0#7
C0#8

Change

64

5

59

2

2

0

59

56

3

6

5

1

96

96

0

18

18

0

60

66

-6

17

10

7

79

1

18

16

2

57

3

5

2

3

80
60

•

61

61

0

14

14

0

65

33

32

4

2

2

55

44

11

9

2

11

3

29

39

-10

6

3

21

16

5

9

10

-1

84

78

6

18

18

0

10

10

0

2

2

0

89

90

-1

18

17

1

100

51

-49

12

50

50

0

29

30

-1

Rokeach Value Survey
scores

Posttest

mean
WW

18

-6

2

3

-1

8

7

1

(low scores mean equality

is

valued ,

:

equality is not valued).
AM W

^

——

——

——

in the experimental group became more liberal, 2 of the subjects
exhibited no change in political identity, and 1 subject became
more conservative from the pretest to the posttest.
In the

control group, 2 of the subjects became more liberal, two exhib
ited no change, and 4 became more conservative. With respect to
the ranking of the value equality, none of the subjects in the
experimental group decreased the rank of this value, while 6 of
the subjects increased its ranking and 2 of the subjects exhib
ited no change.
In the control group, 3 subjects•decreased the
ranking of equality, two subjects exhibited no change, and 3 of
24
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the subjects increased the ranking of this value.
Thus, as we
might expect, the changes in the control group from the pretest
to the posttest appear to be mostly random; a few subjects became
more liberal, a few became more conservative, and a few stayed
the same.
In contrast, in the experimental group we find a
pervasive shift toward a more liberal position, for both politi
cal identity and the importance placed on the value equality.
A close look at the change in political identity scores for the
experimental subjects reveals some interesting information.
Specifically, two subjects, EX#1 and EX#8, appear to account for
most of the aggregate liberal shift in this group.
These sub
jects shifted their political identity 59 and 32 points in a
liberal direction respectively.
Both subjects indicated that
they were mildly conservative at the pretest, and one (EX#1)
shifted this identity to quite liberal at the posttest while the
other
(EX#8) became mildly liberal.
The likely source of these
dramatic changes is the contradiction between their pretest poli
tical identity scores and the importance both of these subjects
placed on the value equality.
As indicated, at the pretest one
subject (EX#1) had ranked equality 2 and the other subject (EX#6)
had ranked equality 4.
Thus, consistent with self-confrontation
theory (Rokeach, 1973), when these two subjects were presented
with feedback suggesting a strong contradiction existed between
the importance they placed on the value equality and their cqnservative political identities they apparently experienced a
state of self-dissatisfaction focusing on their political identi
ties.
And, motivated by the need to reduce their feelings of
self-dissatisfaction

and

to

maintain

or

enhance, their

self-

esteem, these subjects shifted their political identities in a
direction that was more consistent with their value for equality
and therefore also consistent with their image of themselves as

good Americans.
CONCLUDING

DISCUSSION

The findings of this experiment indicated that

(1)

the effect

of self-confrontation on change in political identity varied by
level of psychological centrality and (2) only those subjects for
whom the political identity was "very important" appeared to be
affected by self-confrontation; these subjects shifted their
political identity in the predicted direction an average of 11.44
points on the 100 point political identity scale.
Much smaller
changes were found for experimental subjects who indicated that
their political identity was anything less than "very important."
The data provided by this experiment appear to provide at least
modest support for the view that psychologically central selfconceptions are not immune to experimental treatment.
Yet, a
number of questions can certainly be raised about the theoretical
and methodological integrity of this experiment. It is useful to
briefly consider several of the most important questions.
The first issue concerns the validity of our measures of both

political identity and psychological centrality.

How consistent

are these operational measures with self-concept theory as devel

oped above?
Wouldn't it have been more consistent with this
theory to have measured political identity by asking subjects to
25
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"please write down 20 statements in answer to the question Who am
I?"
And, further, wouldn't it follow that the psychological
centrality of the political identity should have been measured by
asking subjects to "please reorder these 20 statements in terms
of how important they are to defining who you are as a person?"
In truth, this is exactly what was done in a pilot study. Unfor
tunately, of the 2,550 self-statements that were obtained from
218 student subjects at Washington State University during the
fall of 1984, only 50 (2.0%) could be classified in any way as a
political identity, and an even smaller number than these 50
reflected the conservative—liberal ideological spectrum.
It was
estimated that approximately 20,000 self-statements from some
1,000 students would have had to have been screened to generate a

complete pretest-posttest sample of just 100 volunteer subjects.
Thus it could be argued that political identity is clearly not a
very salient identity for most college students.
In response, I

would agree that political identity is not a central identity for
most college students.
However, this is precisely why these
students were asked to indicate exactly how important the identi

ty was to them, and why we controlled on the degree of importance
in the analysis. And, as discussed above, only the students who
indicated that their political identity was "very important" to
them changed to any significant extent. We did not expect across
the board changes in the experimental group because 1) not all

subjects would have discovered a discrepancy between their values
and their political identity and 2) even those who discovered
such a discrepancy might not be motivated to change their identi
ty if that identity was not particularly important to them.
Second, aside from problems of opefationalization and measure
ment, it can still be argued that the first hypothesis is in some
sense still correct,

despite the evidence presented here.

Not

all, or even most, of the subjects in the "very important" exper
imental group changed their identities as a result of selfconfrontation.

Of course, not all of the subjects should have

changed their political identities since not all of the subjects

discovered contradictions between their identities and their

value for equality. Yet, a few of these subjects (e.g. EX#2,
EX#6) exhibited just as much inconsistency between their ranking
of equality and their political identity as those subjects who

did change.
It may be, as the first hypothesis suggests, that
some of these subjects refused to change their psychologically
central self-conceptions, even when provided feedback implicating
their morality, because of the need for self-consistency the
need to hold on to this political identity because it is an

important part of their self-concept that was threatened. This
may be true, but there is some evidence against this interpreta

tion. To some extent, the self-consistency effect predicted by
the first hypothesis resembles a type of ego defense reaction or
a reflection of a rigidity in personality. Research by Cochrane

and Kelley (cited in Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984: 49) indicates

that neither dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960) nor authoritarianism
(Adorno et al., 1950) prevent value change induced by self-

confrontation.

Further, Rokeach (see Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984:

36-38) has explicitly developed the method of self-confrontation,

rather than confrontation by another, to minimize the possibility
26
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of ego defense reactions.
Thus, it seems unlikely that a need
for self-consistency underlies the failure of some subjects to
change as a result of self-confrontation.
Instead, we would
argue that these subjects either misunderstood or did not believe

the feedback that was presented to them and,
they did not experience self-confrontation.

as a consequence,

There is, however, at least one other alternative interpreta
tion of these findings that would support the first hypothesis.
It could be argued that the self-confrontation presented some
subjects with a contradiction between two self-conceptions:
a
self-conception based on high support for the value equality
(i.e.
"I am someone who believes in equal rights for all") and
the political identity. And, those subjects who ranked equality
quite high but also called themselves conservatives (e.g. EX#1
and

EX#8)

shifted

their

political

identities

to

be

consistent

with their highly important, equality-based, self-conception. If
it were the case, however, that self-consistency, and not selfesteem, motivated these changes, then why did we not find some
conservative subjects lowering their ranking of equality? Such a
shift would have achieved self-consistency just as a change in
political identity achieved it.
But this is not what we found;
not one of the experimental subjects in the "most important"
group lowered the importance thev placed on the value egualitv

from the pretest to the posttest.

Thus,

it would seem that the

changes we observed among the "very important" subjects were
motivated not by a need for self-consistency, but by a need for
self-esteem.

A third issue concerns the generalizability of our findings
beyond the college population.
Here we can rely to some extent
on the findings generated by Rokeach and others (see BallRokeach,

1984:

29-36

for

a

review)

from

more

than

25

self-

confrontation experiments.
The accumulated evidence suggests
that self-confrontation works with all kinds of people in and out
of the social psychology laboratory. Though these previous stu
dies have not targeted the political identity per se, there is no
reason to believe that targeting political identities rather than
values,

attitudes, or behaviors would invalidate these results.
Nevertheless, the answer to this question must be determined
empirically.

Finally, how do we reconcile the findings from this study with
those reported by other experimental attempts to alter the self-

concept, particularly the empirical base supporting Alexander's
(Alexander and Wiley, 1981) "situated identity" theory? As noted
above, from this point of view, even the subjects who cared very
little about their political identities should have become more
liberal

as

a

result

of

self-confrontation

because

the

liberal

identity was defined as socially desirable in the experimental
situation.
Referring back to Table 4, we do find that the 3
subjects in the experimental group who cared least about their
political identity did become more liberal an average of 3 points
from the pretest to the posttest.
But this shift is relatively
small and the number of subjects so few that we are really
stretching the evidence to take these findings as support of
Alexander's theory.
It seems more likely that these subjects,
and perhaps others in the "somewhat important" and the "not very
27
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important" groups, were unaffected by self-confrontation because
they didn't even have enough interest in politics or their polit
ical identities to take the time to really understand the meaning
of the information that was presented to them. Had they, some of
them might have adopted a liberal identity because it was defined
as socially desirable and because they had little or nothing to
lose by doing so.

Taken as a whole, the above considerations advise some caution
in the interpretation of the results of this experiment.
What
seems certain is that there are good theoretical reasons, and now
some empirical evidence, to support the view that attempts to
change self-concept will be affected by the degree of psychologi
cal centrality of the self-conception in question.
In short, we
can expect to find an interaction between treatment and psycho
logical centrality.
But few would disagree with this.
What is
far less certain, however, and is subject to some disagreement,
is the exact functional

form of this interaction.

At

the very

least, the findings reported here indicate that some people who
tell us that a particular role-identity is very important to them
can be motivated to change that self-conception as a result of an
experimental treatment.
That we have been able to induce change
in such psychologically central self-conceptions in a social
psychological experiment is contrary to at least one hypothesis

regarding the nature of the relationship between psychological
centrality and self-concept change (Rosenberg, 1979: 75-76).
While further research is clearly needed, (footnote #2), the
results of this experiment indicate that Rokeach's method of
self-confrontation may provide a useful device for further
exploring the "thorny problem of self-concept change" (Rosenberg,
1979: 76) both in (Rokeach, 1973) and out (Ball-Rokeach et al.,
1984) of the social psychology laboratory.
FOOTNOTES

1. As a reviewer pointed out, other factors could account for the
contradiction between experimental and clinical findings.
For

example, clinicians may report difficulties inducing selfconcept change because clients are receiving contradictory
feedback from significant others outside of the clinical
setting while the experimental context usually provides a
consistent message about a relevant identity.
I have little
trouble with this point.
In my view, however, the issue is
not so much whether the context is experimental or clinical,
but whether the self-conceptions in question are important or

trivial.
My position is that important self-conceptions are
not immune from experimental (or clinical) change as long as
the treatment (or therapy) implicates a person's feelings of
competence or morality with respect to that self-conception.
2. A natural
follow-up to this study would be to replicate the
experiment with a sample of political activists e.g. "Young
Republicans."
If the results were similar, such a finding
would counter the criticism that, despite controlling for the

importance of political identity as we did here, political
identity was not a salient identity for our subjects.
It
28
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might also prove very useful to triangulate the experimental
approach used here,.perhaps by doing posttest interviews with

the subjects to get some idea of how the subjects experienced
the

process

of

self-confrontation,

and

experiences conform to our expectations.

whether

their

My thanks to a

reviewer for these suggestions.
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